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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
be admitted to enlarge or extend the obligation of another jointly or
jointly and severally bound. Logically and upon principle there can be
but one answer. No such authorization or agency exists, or can be
implied, from the joint contract as will authorize one to act for and
bind the others so as to renew or extend their liability, where the rela-
tionship is merely that of joint debtors. If resort were had to principle
instead of precedent it is difficult to see how the unauthorized payment
by one could bind his co-debtorY.2  It also appears that there is no
practical reason why a part piyment by the principal should toll the
statute as to a surety but not as to a guarantor, since both the surety
and the guarantor, in the real sense, serve the same purpose-to secure
the debt of the debtor. Since N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-27 (1943) is piece-
meal legislation, it is suggested that the statute be amended to provide
that a payment by a party to an obligation, whether payment be made
before or after the statute of limitations has barred the obligation, shall
set the statute running over again only as to the party making the
payment.
PERRY C. HENSON.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence
Until recently it was a settled rule in North Carolina that a general
allegation that -defendant was negligent was an insufficient pleading of
the facts which constituted plaintiff's cause of action,' and as such was
subject to demurrer. 2  This rule underwent a change in the recent case
of Davis v. Rhodes,3 a negligent wrongful death action. There the
questioned allegation was "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly and
negligently struck and collided" with the motor scooter on which the
intestate was riding. This general allegation was held sufficient.
This change was discussed in a recent note,4 where it was pointed
-' Campbell v. Brown, 86 N. C. 376 (1882).
'Whitehead v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., 190 N. C. 197, 129 S. E.
602 (1925) (plaintiff used phone to report fire but could not secure connections;
an allegation that defendant was negligent in not responding to his call was held
insufficient); Thomason v. Durham & Northern R. R., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E.
205 (1906) (allegation that plaintiff suffered damage "from smoke, noise, odors
and vibrations resulting from operation of defendant's railroad"; held, no cause of
action stated); Conley v. Richmond & Danville Ry., 109 N. C. 69Z 14 S. E. 303
(1891) (averment stated that intestate was killed and slain by the negligence
of defendant; held too general) ; cf. Lanier v. Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200,
98 S. E. 593 (1919) (plaintiff alleged that he was "induced to sign a deed by
fraud"; held, insufficient); Citizens Bank v. Cahagan, 210 N. C. 464, 187 S. E.
580 (1936) (allegation that a certain sum was then due and owing held insufficient).
2 "The defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face
thereof that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action." N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
S231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
'29 N. C. L. RLy. 89 (1950).
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out that perhaps the change was not too drastic, concluding that in the
future the court would possibly hold general allegations sufficient only
in negligence actions, and might further restrict such general pleading
to negligence actions involving wrongful death. Thus, future pleaders
of negligence actions, not involving wrongful death, were left in doubt
as to whether a cause of action could be stated by alleging negligence
generally. Following the Davis decision, the court could have further
liberalized its requirements so as to attain that -degree of conciseness
allowed by the federal courts.5
However, in Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,8 the court
did not see fit to so liberalize; instead it reverted to the old rule that a
general allegation is insufficient.7 In this case, the plaintiff owned a
warehouse to which defendant supplied electric current. During a storm
some of the electric wires outside the warehouse broke; there were
red hot wires going into the structure, and flashing wires dangling
loose. Suddenly, plaintiff's warehouse burst into flames from a fire of
unknown origin starting on the inside of the structure.8 Action was
brought on two theories of negligence; first, a very particularized allega-
tion that the defendant was negligent in not shutting off the current,
and, second, a general allegation "that defendant negligently permitted
electric current in such volume as to set fire to plaintiff's warehouse to
pass through its wires." At the trial, plaintiff proceeded only with
respect to the first theory and did not introduce evidence to substantiate
the second theory. The trial judge refused to charge the jury on the
second theory.0 After a verdict was rendered for defendant on the
first theory, plaintiff appealed, contending the judge erred in refusing
to charge the jury on the second.10
I "A pleading ... shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing the pleader is entitled to recover." 28 U. S. C. §& (1950). This allows an
allegation of negligence to take on this form: ". . . defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff" who was thereby injured. FED. R. CIv. P.,
form 9.
'232 N. C. 457, 61 S. E. 2d 364 (1950).
"A complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts con-
stituting a cause of action.' N. C. GEN'r. STAr. §1-122 (1943).
' It seems the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might apply to these facts. See,
McAllister v. Pryor, 187 N. C. 832, 123 S. E. 177 (1922) ; Turner v. Southern
Power Co., 154 N. C. 131, 69 S. E. 767 (1910). However, plaintiff could not
successfully invoke this doctrine here because he could not show that the fire
originated from electricity. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie where
more than one inference can be drawn as to the cause of the injury. See, Corum
v. R J. Reynold's Tobacco Co., 205 N. C. 213, 171 S. E. 78 (1933) ; Springs v.
Doll, 197 N. C. 240, 148 S. E. 251 (1929).
'"Where there is any evidence to support a plaintiff's claim it is the duty of
the judge to submit the question to the jury, who are the judges of its weight."
Wittkowsky & Ritch v. Wasson, 71 N. C. 451, 454 (1874).
"It is not enough to say that there was some evidence, a mere scintilla, for
there must be evidence on which the jury might reasonably conclude that there
was negligence. Smith v. Duke University, 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643
(1941) ; Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N. C. 378, 177 S. E. 170 (1934).
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The court affirmed for two reasons; that the allegation did not
specify wherein the negligence consisted,1 and, as plaintiff had offered
no proof to substantiate the allegation, he could not proffer an efficacious
appeal because "an appeal ex necessitate follows the theory of the
trial. 1 2  Hence, plaintiff had no basis for an appeal."3
This latter reason alone would be sufficient to defeat plaintiff, and
the reason that the allegation is too general was not necessary, yet, it
was powerfully stated. Consequently, it seems probable that the court
inserted it to serve notice on future pleaders that a general allegation
3f negligence is an insufficient pleading of a cause of action.
In the future, the Davis case will probably be limited to its facts
and North Carolina will probably require specific allegations of negli-
gence. It should be noted, however, that the Fleming case made no
mention of the Davis case, and the latter was decided on demurrer
while the former was not. Even so, cautious pleaders of negligence
should make specific allegations of the manner in which the defendant
was negligent.
RicHAD L. GriFFin.
Pleadings-Overruling of Demurrer for Misjoinder of Parties
and Causes--Effect of Reversal on Appeal
The question was recently presented' as to whether an action was
still pending after the North Carolina Supreme Court had reversed the
lower court's judgment2 overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of parties
and causes of action.3
After the first opinion was certified down, but before the lower
court had acted in accordance therewith,4 plaintiffs moved for leave to
file an amended complaint.5 When the motion came before him, the
resident judge concluded that the Supreme Court had sustained the
"1 The complaint did set out a cause of action on another theory of negligence.
"Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 232 N. C. 457, 463, 61 S. E. 2d
364, 369 (1950).
3 Coral Gables, Inc. v. Ayres, 208 N. C. 426, 181 S. E. 263 (1935) ; Edgerton
v. Perkins, 200 N. C. 650, 158 S. E. 197 (1931).
1 Teague v. Siler City Oil Co., 232 N. C. 469, 61 S. E. 2d 345 (1950).
' Teague v. Sler City Oil Co., 232 N. C. 65, 59 S. E. 2d 2 (1950).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-123 (1943) determines what causes of action may be
joined. For a thorough discussion of joinder of parties and causes, see Brandis,
Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. REV. 1,
16 ( 1946).
1See MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CML CASES
§694 (1929) for the disposition of a case on appeal.
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-163 (1943) allows amendments in the discretion of the
court. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-131 (1943) which gives the right to move for leave
to amend when a demurrer is sustained, has no application to cases in which the
action has been dismissed for misjoinder of parties and causes. Grady v. Warren,
202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
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